Political Corruption Traps*

  title={Political Corruption Traps*},
  author={Marko Kla{\vs}nja and Andrew T. Little and Joshua A. Tucker},
  journal={Political Science Research and Methods},
  pages={413 - 428}
Academics and policymakers recognize that there are serious costs associated with systemic corruption. Stubbornly, many countries or regions remain stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium—a “corruption trap.” Most existing theories concentrate on mutually reinforcing expectations of corrupt behavior among a fixed set of bureaucrats or politicians, implying that changing such expectations can lead to lower corruption. We develop models that more fully characterize the political nature of… 

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