Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry

@inproceedings{Joskow1994PoliticalCO,
  title={Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry},
  author={P. Joskow and N. Rose and Catherine Wolfram},
  year={1994}
}
  • P. Joskow, N. Rose, Catherine Wolfram
  • Published 1994
  • Business
  • This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively `pro-consumer' receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second… CONTINUE READING
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