Political Competition: Theory and Applications

@inproceedings{Roemer2001PoliticalCT,
  title={Political Competition: Theory and Applications},
  author={John E. Roemer},
  year={2001}
}
Preface Introduction 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty 1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties 1.2 The Downs Model 1.3 The Wittman Model 1.4 Conclusion 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty 2.3 An Error-Distribution Model of Uncertainty 2.4 A Finite-Type Model 2.5 Conclusion 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Downs Model 3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example 3.4 Existence of… 
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