Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union

@article{Larreguy2017PoliticalBP,
  title={Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union},
  author={Horacio Larreguy and C{\'e}sar E. Montiel Olea and Pablo Querub{\'i}n},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
  year={2017},
  volume={61},
  pages={877-891}
}
Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well-known political machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of… 

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