Political Bias and War

@article{Jackson2006PoliticalBA,
  title={Political Bias and War},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli},
  journal={The American Economic Review},
  year={2006},
  volume={97},
  pages={1353-1373}
}
  • M. Jackson, M. Morelli
  • Published 1 March 2006
  • Political Science, Economics
  • The American Economic Review
We examine how countries' incentives to go to war depend on the "political bias" of their pivotal decision makers. This bias is measured by a decision maker’s risk/ reward ratio from a war compared to that of the country at large. If there is no political bias, then there are mutually acceptable transfers from one country to the other that will avoid a war in the presence of commitment or enforceability of peace treaties. There are cases with a strong enough bias on the part of one or both… 
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