Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

  title={Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case},
  author={John E. Roemer},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  • J. Roemer
  • Published 30 September 1997
  • Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
Abstract. A political–economic environment is studied in which two parties, representing different constituencies of citizens, compete over a proportional tax rate to be levied on private endowments, to finance a public good. Although parties know the distribution of citizen traits (preferences and endowments), they are uncertain about the distribution of traits among the citizens who will turn up at the polls. This uncertainty engenders an endogenously derived function π(t1, t2) giving the… 
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