Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking

  title={Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking},
  author={Richard Clark and Lindsay R. Dolan},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
To what extent do powerful stakeholders shape policy in international organizations? Using an under-utilized data set on the conditions associated with World Bank development policy loans, we find that borrower countries that vote with the U.S. at the UN are required to enact fewer domestic policy reforms, and on fewer and softer issue areas. Though American preferences permeate World Bank decisionmaking, we do not find evidence that borrower countries trade favors and get the U.S. to actively… 

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