Playing for time: A sequential inspection game

  title={Playing for time: A sequential inspection game},
  author={Rudolf Avenhaus and Morton John Canty},
  journal={European Journal of Operational Research},
Inspections for timely detection of illegal activity on a finite, closed time interval and subject to first and second kind errors are modelled as a sequential, two-person game. The utilities of the players, inspector and inspectee, are assumed to be linear in the detection time with time-independent false alarm costs. Sets of Nash equilibria are obtained in which the inspectee behaves illegally or legally with probability one. 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 

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