Playing One’s Part

  title={Playing One’s Part},
  author={Thomas H. Smith},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
The consensus in the philosophical literature on joint action is that, sometimes at least, when agents intentionally jointly φ, this is explicable by their intending that they φ, for a period of time prior to their φ-ing. If this be granted, it poses a dilemma. For agents who so intend either severally or jointly intend that they φ. The first option is ruled out by two stipulations that we may consistently make: (i) that at least one of the agents non-akratically believes that, all things… Expand
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