Platform competition in two sided markets

  title={Platform competition in two sided markets},
  author={Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Triole},
  journal={LSE Research Online Documents on Economics},
  • J. Rochet, Jean Triole
  • Published 1 June 2003
  • Economics, Business
  • LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board”. Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-user surplus for… Expand

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