Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law

  title={Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law},
  author={Peter T. Leeson},
  journal={European Journal of Law and Economics},
  • P. Leeson
  • Published 1 June 2014
  • Law
  • European Journal of Law and Economics
This paper investigates institutions that develop to strengthen or expand the discipline of continuous dealings as a mechanism for privately enforcing law. I consider three such institutions in three different anarchic contexts: that of Caribbean pirates; that of drug-dealing gangs and prison inmates; and that of preliterate tribesmen. These cases highlight several ways in which different anarchic contexts give rise to different private law enforcement institutions. The varieties of private law… 
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