Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View

  title={Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View},
  author={Elliott Sober},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • E. Sober
  • Published 1 August 1999
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Physicalism -like other isms -has meant different things to different people. The main physicalistic thesis I will discuss here is the claim that all occurrences supervene on physical occurrences -that the physical events and states of affairs at a time determine everything that happens at that time. This synchronic claim has been discussed most in the context of the mind/body problem, but it is fruitful to consider as well how the supervenience thesis applies to what might be termed the… Expand
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