Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy

  title={Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy},
  author={David Papineau},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  • D. Papineau
  • Published 1 June 1993
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
ISSN: 0004-8402 (Print) 1471-6828 (Online) Journal homepage: Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy David Papineau To cite this article: David Papineau (1993) Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71:2, 169-183, DOI: 10.1080/00048409312345182 To link to this article: 
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