Philosophy of Mind

@inproceedings{Kim1996PhilosophyOM,
  title={Philosophy of Mind},
  author={Jaegwon Kim},
  year={1996}
}
Preface 1. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Mind? Metaphysical Preliminaries Mind-Body Supervenience Materialism and Physicalism Varieties of Mental Phenomena Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? For Further Reading Notes 2. Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument Immaterial Minds in Space? Substance Dualism… Expand
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590 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
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Background Citations
81
Methods Citations
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590 Citations

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Citation Type

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Psycho-neural Identity as the Basis for Empirical Research and Theorization in Psychology: An Interview with Mario A. Bunge
Avoiding Perennial Mind-Body Problems
Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind
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