Philosophy of Mind

  title={Philosophy of Mind},
  author={Jaegwon Kim},
Preface 1. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Mind? Metaphysical Preliminaries Mind-Body Supervenience Materialism and Physicalism Varieties of Mental Phenomena Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? For Further Reading Notes 2. Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument Immaterial Minds in Space? Substance Dualism… 
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