• Corpus ID: 140438454

Philosophy in the flesh

  title={Philosophy in the flesh},
  author={George Lakoff},
  • G. Lakoff
  • Published 1999
  • Philosophy, Psychology
"We are neural beings," states Berkeley cognitive scientist George Lakoff. "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything only what our embodied brains permit." His new book Philosophy In The Flesh, coauthored by Mark Johnson, makes the following points: "The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are… 

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