Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

  title={Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science},
  author={Shaun Gallagher},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  • S. Gallagher
  • Published 1 January 2000
  • Psychology
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences

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