Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

  title={Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science},
  author={Shaun Gallagher},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  • S. Gallagher
  • Published 1 January 2000
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self… 
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