Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

@inproceedings{Chalmers2006PhenomenalCA,
  title={Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap},
  author={D. Chalmers},
  year={2006}
}
Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. In this paper, I want to explore another reaction to the explanatory gap. Those who react in this way agree that there is an explanatory… Expand
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