Phase-Remapping Attack in Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems

@article{Fung2006PhaseRemappingAI,
  title={Phase-Remapping Attack in Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems},
  author={Chi-Hang Fred Fung and Bing Qi and Kiyoshi Tamaki and Hoi-Kwong Lo},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2006},
  volume={abs/quant-ph/0601115}
}
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used to generate secret keys between two distant parties. Even though QKD has been proven unconditionally secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computation power, practical implementations of QKD may contain loopholes that may lead to the generated secret keys being compromised. In this paper, we propose a phase-remapping attack targeting two practical bidirectional QKD systems (the 'plug-and-play' system and the Sagnac system). We showed that if the… 

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