Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina

  title={Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina},
  author={Susan Stokes},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={315 - 325}
  • S. Stokes
  • Published 1 August 2005
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence… 

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