Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia

  title={Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia},
  author={Jan H Pierskalla and Audrey Sacks},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  pages={1283 - 1305}
Abstract What is the effect of increased electoral competition on patronage politics? If programmatic appeals are not credible, institutional reforms that move politics from an elite- to a mass-focused and more competitive environment increase patronage efforts. This leads to an overall surge and notable spike in discretionary state hiring in election years. The study tests this prediction in the context of Indonesia’s decentralized education sector. The authors exploit the exogenous phasing in… 

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▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives, many observers