Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives

  title={Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives},
  author={Paul D. Oyer and Scott Schaefer},
  journal={ERN: Other Organizations \& Markets: Policies \& Processes (Topic)},
  • Paul D. Oyer, Scott Schaefer
  • Published 1 May 2010
  • Economics, Business
  • ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes (Topic)
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