Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense

@article{Schulz2011PersistentBI,
  title={Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense},
  author={Eric Schulz and Edward T. Cokely and Adam Feltz},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
  year={2011},
  volume={20},
  pages={1722-1731}
}

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