Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense
@article{Schulz2011PersistentBI, title={Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense}, author={Eric Schulz and Edward T. Cokely and Adam Feltz}, journal={Consciousness and Cognition}, year={2011}, volume={20}, pages={1722-1731} }
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