Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

@article{Burks2009PerformancePA,
  title={Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment},
  author={Stephen V Burks and Jeffrey Paul Carpenter and Lorenz Goette},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  year={2009},
  volume={70},
  pages={458-469}
}
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