Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives

  title={Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives},
  author={Leo J. Blanken and Jason J. Lepore},
  journal={Defence and Peace Economics},
  pages={516 - 535}
We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, drives a metric… 
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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations

  • C. Welch
  • Political Science
    Perspectives on Politics
  • 2005
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations. By Peter D. Feaver. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 400p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper. Most scholars work within