Performance-induced CEO turnover

  title={Performance-induced CEO turnover},
  author={Dirk Jenter and NBER djenter},
  • Dirk Jenter, NBER djenter
  • Published 2010
This paper re-examines the empirical relation between CEO turnover and firm performance. We find that boards aggressively fire CEOs for poor performance, and that the turnover-performance sensitivity increases substantially with board quality. In the first five years of tenure, CEOs who perform in the bottom quintile are 42 percentage points more likely to depart than CEOs in the top quintile. This spread increases to more than 70 percentage points for firms with high quality boards. The… CONTINUE READING

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