Performance Pay , Group Selection and Group Performance

@inproceedings{Knigstein2007PerformanceP,
  title={Performance Pay , Group Selection and Group Performance},
  author={Manfred K{\"o}nigstein and Gabriele K. Ruchala},
  year={2007}
}
Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered by the principal. The rational solution of the game implies that contract design may not induce agents to select GT and provide positive effort in… CONTINUE READING

Citations

Publications citing this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 39 references

A Theory of Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior

  • FALK, Armin, FISCHBACHER, Urs
  • 2006

Team Incentives in Public Organizations, CPB

  • Jana VYRASTEKOVA, Sander ONDERSTAL, Pierre KONING
  • Discussion Paper No. 60,
  • 2006
1 Excerpt

A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity

  • DUFWENBERG, Martin, KIRCHSTEIGER, Georg
  • Games and Economic Behavior
  • 2004

Endogenous Group Formation and the Provision of Public Goods: The Role of Promises and Lies, Working paper, University of Cologne, University of Innsbruck and University of Magdeburg

  • Jeannette BROSIG, Magdalena MARGREITER, Joachim WEIMANN
  • 2004

The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 – A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics, Working Paper Series in Economics 10, University of Cologne

  • GREINER, Ben
  • 2004

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…