Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

@article{Rubinstein1982PerfectEI,
  title={Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model},
  author={Ariel Rubinstein},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1982},
  volume={50},
  pages={97-109}
}
Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco) 

Figures from this paper

An exact implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in dominant strategies
For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem.
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level
A bilateral bargaining model with randomly chosen offer rights
  • Pan Yue, Zheng Yingping
  • Economics
    1996 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. Information Intelligence and Systems (Cat. No.96CH35929)
  • 1996
We present a model to analyze the influence of the offer right in bilateral bargainings, which is characterized by two variables, that is, the frequency to make offers and the right to make first
Bargaining Power in Contracting with Externalities .
We study a model of non-cooperative bargaining between two buyers and a seller in the presence of externalities and coordination between buyers. We …nd that bargaining can break buyer coordination
Equilibrium selection in bargaining models
TLDR
It is shown that random best- response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable.
Forward Contracting Specification Through Collective Bargaining
Game-based bargaining theory is presented to evaluate the potential of and stability of cooperative coalition among producers for enhancing producer returns and managing market price and income risk.
Sustainable solutions for dynamic bargaining problems
Contract bargaining with symmetric information
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form, existence, and
On the Asymptotic Uniqueness of Bargaining Equilibria
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash
...
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 20 REFERENCES
A theory of the bargaining process
Offers a precise analysis of bargaining by means of a positive theory based on familiar economic concepts. Use of Nash theory; Components and the dynamic nature of bargaining process; Three
An N-Person Bargaining Game in the Extensive Form
Can the outcome of bargaining between two rational parties be determined? Although much of the discussion in bargaining literature revolves around this question, no satisfactory answer has been
Two-Person Cooperative Games
In this paper, the autor extends his previous treatment of «The Bargaining Problem» to a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role/ A new approach is introduced involving the
Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
The paper extends Nash's theory of two-person bargaining games with fixed threats to bargaining situations with incomplete information. After defining such bargaining situations, a formal bargaining
Axiomatic models of bargaining
I: Nash's Model of Bargaining.- Section A. Introduction.- Section B. The Formal Model and Axiomatic Derivation.- Nash's Theorem.- Individual Rationality.- Symmetry and Asymmetry.- Section C.
Nash Bargaining Theory I
  • International Center for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics, Discussion Paper 80-09, 1980.
  • 1980
A note on the Hicks theory of strike bargaining
Altruism as an Outcome of Social Interaction
Two-person Cooperative Games
...
...