Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Repeated Sales
@article{Devanur2015PerfectBE, title={Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Repeated Sales}, author={Nikhil R. Devanur and Y. Peres and Balasubramanian Sivan}, journal={ArXiv}, year={2015}, volume={abs/1409.3062} }
A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a natural repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to the same buyer every day via a posted price. The buyer's value for the item is unknown to the seller but is drawn initially from a publicly known distribution F and remains the same throughout. One key aspect of this game is revelation of the buyer's… CONTINUE READING
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