Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will

  title={Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will},
  author={Adam Feltz},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
  • Adam Feltz
  • Published 1 March 2013
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • Consciousness and Cognition

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