Perceptual systems and realism

  title={Perceptual systems and realism},
  author={Athanasios Raftopoulos},
Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the… 
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The Nonconceptual Content of Experience
1 Concepts and perceptual experience To what extent do our beliefs about the world affect what we see? Our beliefs certainly affect where we choose to look, but do they affect what we see when we
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The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal
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Abstract: Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar
Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain
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Abstract:  We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved
Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches.
  • J. Norman
  • Psychology, Biology
    The Behavioral and brain sciences
  • 2002
A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious.
Mind and the World
This book is strongly recommended to all who take an intelligent interest in the problems of the nature of man and his relationship to the world.
Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence
How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the