Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge

@article{Roessler2009PerceptualEA,
  title={Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge},
  author={Johannes Roessler},
  journal={Mind},
  year={2009},
  volume={118},
  pages={1013-1041}
}
Commonsense epistemology regards perceptual experience as a distinctive source of knowledge of the world around us, unavailable in 'blindsight'. This is often interpreted in terms of the idea that perceptual experience, through its representational content, provides us with justifying reasons for beliefs about the world around us. I argue that this analysis distorts the explanatory link between perceptual experience and knowledge, as we ordinarily conceive it. I propose an alternative analysis… Expand
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