Perception, attention and demonstrative thought: in defense of a hybrid metasemantic mechanism

@article{Carvalho2020PerceptionAA,
  title={Perception, attention and demonstrative thought: in defense of a hybrid metasemantic mechanism},
  author={F. Carvalho},
  journal={Manuscrito},
  year={2020},
  volume={43},
  pages={16-53}
}
Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing… Expand

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