Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia

  title={Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia},
  author={Paul C. Fletcher and ChrisD . Frith},
  journal={Nature Reviews Neuroscience},
Advances in cognitive neuroscience offer us new ways to understand the symptoms of mental illness by uniting basic neurochemical and neurophysiological observations with the conscious experiences that characterize these symptoms. Cognitive theories about the positive symptoms of schizophrenia — hallucinations and delusions — have tended to treat perception and belief formation as distinct processes. However, recent advances in computational neuroscience have led us to consider the unusual… 
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