Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias

  title={Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias},
  author={Hongyao Ma and R. Meir and David C. Parkes and Elena Wu-Yan},
From skipped exercise classes to last-minute cancellation of dentist appointments, underutilization of reserved resources abounds. Likely reasons include uncertainty about the future, further exacerbated by present bias. In this paper, we unite resource allocation and commitment devices through the design of contingent payment mechanisms, and propose the two-bid penalty-bidding mechanism. This extends an earlier mechanism proposed by Ma et al. (2019), assigning the resources based on… Expand
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