Corpus ID: 236428229

Peace through bribing

  title={Peace through bribing},
  author={Jingfeng Lu and Zongwei Lu and Christian Riis},
We study a model in which before a conflict between two parties escalates into a war (in the form of an all-pay auction), a party can offer a take-it-or-leave-it bribe to the other one for a peaceful settlement. We distinguish between various degrees of peace prospects–implementability, weak security and strong security. We first characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace implementability and weak security. We then show that weak security implies strong security. We also… Expand


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Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security
  • C. Zheng
  • Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 2019
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