Pascal's Wager and the Many Gods Objection

  title={Pascal's Wager and the Many Gods Objection},
  author={Paul Saka},
  journal={Religious Studies},
  pages={321 - 341}
  • P. Saka
  • Published 1 September 2001
  • Philosophy
  • Religious Studies
Pascal's Wager is finding ever more defenders who aim to undermine the old Many Gods Objection. It is my thesis that they are mistaken. After describing the Wager and the objection, I report on Jeff Jordan's repeated attempt to limit legitimate religious hypotheses to those that are traditional. In separate sections I criticize Jordan, first coming from epistemology and second from anthropology. Then I describe George Schlesinger's repeated appeal to the ‘simplest’ religious hypothesis, and… 
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