Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

  title={Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis},
  author={Lawrence C. Dodd},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={1093 - 1117}
  • L. Dodd
  • Published 1 September 1974
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
This study focuses on A. Lawrence Lowell's classic thesis that a parliamentary democracy must possess a majority party system if durable cabinets are to exist. The argument of this study is that majority party government is not essential to cabinet durability. Rather, in line with the British analyst W. L. Middleton as well as more contemporary game-theoreticians, the critical factor is held to be the coalitional status of the cabinet: (1) cabinets of minimum winning status should be durable… 

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