Partner Selection Shapes the Strategic and Topological Evolution of Cooperation

  title={Partner Selection Shapes the Strategic and Topological Evolution of Cooperation},
  author={Faqi Du and Feng Fu},
  journal={Dynamic Games and Applications},
  • Faqi Du, Feng Fu
  • Published 5 May 2011
  • Economics
  • Dynamic Games and Applications
Coevolution of individual strategies and social ties, in which individuals not only adjust their strategies by social learning but also switch their adverse partners to search for potential beneficial ones, has attracted increasing attention very recently. It is found that the interplay of strategic updating and partner network adaptation can facilitate the escape from the stalemate of cooperation in social dilemmas. But the question how individual preferential partner choice shapes the… 
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