Partition-edit-count: naive extensional reasoning in judgment of conditional probability.

  title={Partition-edit-count: naive extensional reasoning in judgment of conditional probability.},
  author={Craig R. Fox and Jonathan Levav},
  journal={Journal of experimental psychology. General},
  volume={133 4},
  • C. Fox, Jonathan Levav
  • Published 1 December 2004
  • Psychology
  • Journal of experimental psychology. General
The authors provide evidence that people typically evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively partitioning the sample space into n interchangeable events, editing out events that can be eliminated on the basis of conditioning information, counting remaining events, then reporting probabilities as a ratio of the number of focal to total events. Participants' responses to conditional probability problems were influenced by irrelevant information (Study 1), small variations in problem… 

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