Partition-edit-count: naive extensional reasoning in judgment of conditional probability.

@article{Fox2004PartitioneditcountNE,
  title={Partition-edit-count: naive extensional reasoning in judgment of conditional probability.},
  author={C. Fox and Jonathan Levav},
  journal={Journal of experimental psychology. General},
  year={2004},
  volume={133 4},
  pages={
          626-42
        }
}
The authors provide evidence that people typically evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively partitioning the sample space into n interchangeable events, editing out events that can be eliminated on the basis of conditioning information, counting remaining events, then reporting probabilities as a ratio of the number of focal to total events. Participants' responses to conditional probability problems were influenced by irrelevant information (Study 1), small variations in problem… Expand
View on PubMed
www0.gsb.columbia.edu
63 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
9
Background Citations
35
Methods Citations
13
Results Citations
6

Figures and Tables from this paper

63 Citations

Citation Type

Citation Type

Partition Priming in Judgments of Imprecise Probabilities
Another chance for good reasoning
Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty.
Assigning Subjective Probabilities to Event Trees: Partition Dependence and Bias Toward the Ignorance Prior
Using statistical reasoning performance to reveal information parsing preferences in the mind
  • Gary L. Brase
  • Computer Science, Medicine
  • Quarterly journal of experimental psychology
  • 2015
How Many Alternatives? Partitions Pose Problems for Predictions and Diagnoses
Subjective Probability Assessment in Decision Analysis: Partition Dependence and Bias Toward the Ignorance Prior
Children’s understanding of posterior probability
Sets or frequencies? How to explain the facilitation effect in conditional probability problems
Effects of Temporal and Causal Schemas on Probability Problem Solving
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 57 REFERENCES
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
Partition Priming in Judgment Under Uncertainty
Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning
AMBIGUITIES AND UNSTATED ASSUMPTIONS IN PROBABILISTIC REASONING
Some teasers concerning conditional probabilities
Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: advances in support theory.
Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the “problem of three prisoners”
...
1
2
3
4
5
...