• Corpus ID: 233476312

Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints

@article{Chen2021ParticipatoryBW,
  title={Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints},
  author={Jiehua Chen and Martin Lackner and Jan Maly},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2104.15075}
}
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where citizens may give additional money to projects they want to see funded. We introduce a formal framework for this kind of PB with donations. Our framework also allows for diversity constraints, meaning that each project belongs to one or more types, and there are lower and upper bounds on the number of projects of the… 

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