Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements

  title={Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements},
  author={Marco Battaglini and B{\aa}rd Harstad}
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free-ride rather than participate. If investments are non-contractible, countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem can be mitigated and significant… CONTINUE READING
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