Parochial altruism in humans

@article{Bernhard2006ParochialAI,
  title={Parochial altruism in humans},
  author={Helen Bernhard and Urs Fischbacher and Ernst Fehr},
  journal={Nature},
  year={2006},
  volume={442},
  pages={912-915}
}
Social norms and the associated altruistic behaviours are decisive for the evolution of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order, and they affect family life, politics and economic interactions. However, as altruistic norm compliance and norm enforcement often emerge in the context of inter-group conflicts, they are likely to be shaped by parochialism—a preference for favouring the members of one's ethnic, racial or language group. We have conducted punishment experiments, which… 

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