Pareto-efficiency without giving-in: a two-phased protocol for multiple-attribute negotiations

@article{Lang2005ParetoefficiencyWG,
  title={Pareto-efficiency without giving-in: a two-phased protocol for multiple-attribute negotiations},
  author={Florian Lang and Constantin Brunn},
  journal={Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05)},
  year={2005},
  pages={182-189}
}
Multiple-attribute contracting allows the alignment of consumers' complex demand profiles and the specific delivery capabilities of suppliers. A two-phased negotiation model is introduced that includes both self-interested negotiations driven by a heuristic strategy and a joint-gains approach to win/win-negotiations. The concept of Pareto-efficiency on imperfect markets (integrative phase) is combined with a strategy-driven, non-altruistic approach to individual utility maximization… CONTINUE READING

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