Pareto Damaging Behaviors

@article{Fisman2005ParetoDB,
  title={Pareto Damaging Behaviors},
  author={Raymond J. Fisman and Shachar Kariv and Daniel Markovits},
  journal={Yale Law School},
  year={2005}
}
This paper reports a rigorous experimental test of Pareto-damaging behaviors. We introduce a new graphical representation of dictator games with step-shaped sets of feasible payoffs to persons self and other on which strongly Pareto efficient allocations involve substantial inequality. The non-convexity and sharp nonlinearity of the Pareto frontier allow us systematically to classify Pareto-damaging allocations: as self-damaging or other-damaging and as inequality-increasing or inequality… 
4 Citations
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