• DOI:10.1007/BF01313557
• Corpus ID: 170517621

Pantheism, substance and unity

@article{Levine1992PantheismSA,
  title={Pantheism, substance and unity},
  author={Michael Levine},
  journal={International Journal for Philosophy of Religion},
  year={1992},
  volume={32},
  pages={1-23}
}

• M. Levine
• Published 1 August 1992
• Philosophy
• International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Pantheism is the view that "... everything that exists constitutes a unity [in some sense] and ... this all-inclusive unity is divine [in some sense]."1 Rather than mere synonomy of world and God, or all-inclusiveness per se, the central claim of pantheism must be understood in terms of what is meant by Unity. By "Unity" I mean unity in the relevant pantheistic sense. It is of course possible to predicate unity of all kinds of things in all kinds of ways ways that have nothing to do with Unity. Substantival monism, in some form, has often been taken as the basis for the predication of Unity to the all-inclusive unity that pantheists allege to be God. I shall argue that this is not a plausible ground for the attribution of Unity. The reasons for this have wider implications for any adequate criterion of Unity, and for understanding any plausible reasons there might be for taking everything to be a Unity.