Pandemic Potential of a Strain of Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings

  title={Pandemic Potential of a Strain of Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings},
  author={Christophe Fraser and Christl Ann Donnelly and Simon Cauchemez and William P. Hanage and Maria D. Van Kerkhove and T. D{\'e}irdre Hollingsworth and Jamie T. Griffin and Rebecca F. Baggaley and Helen E. Jenkins and Emily J. Lyons and Thibaut Jombart and Wes Hinsley and Nicholas C. Grassly and François Balloux and Azra C. Ghani and Neil M. Ferguson and Andrew Rambaut and Oliver G. Pybus and Hugo Lopez-Gatell and Celia Mercedes Alpuche-Aranda and Ietza Boj{\'o}rquez Chapela and Ethel Palacios Zavala and Dulce Ma Espejo Guevara and Francesco Checchi and Erika Garcia and St{\'e}phane Hugonnet and Cathy E. Roth},
  pages={1557 - 1561}
Swine Flu Benchmark The World Health Organization (WHO) announced on 29 April 2009, a level-5 pandemic alert for a strain of H1N1 influenza originating in pigs in Mexico and transmitting from human to human in several countries. Fraser et al. (p. 1557, published online 11 May; see the cover) amassed a team of experts in Mexico and WHO to make an initial assessment of the outbreak with a view to guiding future policy. The outbreak appears to have originated in mid-February in the village of La… 
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Clinical aspects of pandemic 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection.
Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society. During the spring of 2009, a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus of swine origin caused human infection and acute respiratory illness in Mexico.1,2 After
[H1N1 influenza - pandemic, 2009].
Based on epidemiologic data and worldwide experiences on influenza vaccination, both seasonal and H1N1 vaccinations are recommended for anyone 6 months of age or older who is at risk of becoming ill or of transmitting the viruses to others.
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Swine-origin influenza virus A(H1N1)v: lessons learnt from the early phase of the epidemic.
  • G. Rezza
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Oseltamivir resistance during treatment of influenza A (H5N1) infection.
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Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic
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Mortality and influenza.
Systematic virologic surveillance in Houston over the past seven years has revealed that influenza virus infections have been epidemic during each respiratory disease season, and the methods used to predict base-line mortality that show a seasonal rise in the absence of influenza activity may be inaccurate and lead to underestimation of mortality associated with flu virus infections.