Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

@article{Conitzer2019PacingEI,
  title={Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets},
  author={Vincent Conitzer and Christian Kroer and Debmalya Panigrahi and Okke Schrijvers and Eric Sodomka and Nicol{\'a}s E. Stier Moses and Chris Wilkens},
  journal={Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  year={2019}
}
  • Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, +4 authors Chris Wilkens
  • Published 2019
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
  • In the isolated auction of a single item, second price is often preferable to first price in properties of theoretical interest. Unfortunately, single items are rarely sold in true isolation, so considering the broader context is critical when adopting a pricing strategy. In this paper, we show that this context is important in a model centrally relevant to Internet advertising: when items (ad impressions) are individually auctioned within the context of a larger system that is managing budgets… CONTINUE READING

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