PREFERENCES VS. DESIRES: DEBATING THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CONATIVE STATES

@article{Schulz2015PREFERENCESVD,
  title={PREFERENCES VS. DESIRES: DEBATING THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CONATIVE STATES},
  author={Armin W. Schulz},
  journal={Economics and Philosophy},
  year={2015},
  volume={31},
  pages={239 - 257}
}
Abstract: I address an overlooked question about the structure of the cognitive/conative model of the mind that underlies much of the work in economics, psychology and philosophy: namely, whether conative states are fundamentally monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like). I argue that two seemingly promising sets of theoretical considerations – namely, the structure of Rational Choice Theory, and considerations of computational efficiency – are unable to resolve this debate. Given… Expand
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