author={Hartry Field},
  journal={The Review of Symbolic Logic},
  pages={342 - 359}
  • Hartry Field
  • Published 1 June 2009
  • Philosophy
  • The Review of Symbolic Logic
A number of people have proposed that we should be pluralists about logic, but there are several things this can mean. Are there versions of logical pluralism that are both high on the interest scale and also true? After discussing some forms of pluralism that seem either insufficiently interesting or quite unlikely to be true, the paper suggests a new form which might be both interesting and true; however, the scope of the pluralism that it allows logic is extremely narrow. 

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Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

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Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

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  • J. Evershed
  • Philosophy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
  • 2021
According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two

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It is argued that the best motivation for logical pluralism will ultimately be rooted in certain kinds of performative data, and that the kind of evidence that would support logical pluralists should be drawn.



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