author={Derek Parfit},
[4] The first is that in these cases the question about identity must have an answer. No one thinks this about, say, nations or machines. Our criteria for the identity of these do not cover certain cases. No one thinks that in these cases the questions "Is it the same nation?" or "Is it the same machine?" must have answers. Some people believe that in this respect they are different. They agree that our criteria of personal identity do not cover certain cases, but they believe that the nature… Expand
Disagreeing about who we are
ABSTRACT One argument that has been suggested for conventionalism about personal identity is that it captures that certain disagreements about personal identity seem irresolvable, without beingExpand
Personal Identity and What Matters 1
There are two general views about the nature of what matters, i.e. about the metaphysical ground of prudential concern, the ground of the concern we have for our own future welfare. On the one hand,Expand
Intuitions about personal identity are rooted in essentialist thinking across development
These studies advance theory on the psychology of personal identity by identifying a reason why people assign a central role to physical composition when judging identity. Expand
Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View
Abstract Among theories of personal identity over time, the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non-philosophers. It may beExpand
Wide content and psychological continuity views of personal identity
Externalism about mental content is the thesis that the content of at least some of a subject’s mental states is individuated by things in the subject’s environment. Psychological continuity accountsExpand
Personal Identity and Practical Concerns
Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). IExpand
Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited
Abstract Eric Olson has argued, startlingly, that no coherent account can be giv- en of the distinction made in the personal identity literature between ‘complex views’ and ‘simple views’. ‘We tellExpand
Folk concepts of person and identity: A response to Nichols and Bruno
Nichols and Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that inExpand
When are universals? the relationship between universals and time
In Re realism is the two-pronged view that, first, when this and that have the same color, this color and that color are identical. There is just one color, the universal. Second, on the view, thisExpand
Split identity: Intransitive judgments of the identity of objects
  • L. Rips
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Cognition
  • 2011
Identity is a transitive relation, according to all standard accounts. Necessarily, if x=y and y=z, then x=z. However, people sometimes say that two objects, x and z, are the same as a third, y, evenExpand